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The Problem of Gender Inequity: The Legacy
of Deborah Rhode
Joanna L. Grossman†
When I agreed to contribute an essay reflecting on the work
of Deborah Rhode, I expected it to be in her honor rather than in
her memory. She passed away unexpectedly at the age of sixtyeight on January 8, 2021.1 The opportunity to reflect on her legacy
thus takes on a new urgency—and even greater significance. The
legal profession is better for the time she spent in it.2
I was fortunate enough to know Deborah first as a professor
and later as a coauthor and a friend. She was only the second
woman to join the faculty at Stanford Law School—following in
the giant footsteps of Barbara Babcock. 3 Deborah served on the
faculty for over forty years, as well as in significant board and
leadership positions throughout the academy and the broader
profession, including an important stint as president of the
Association of American Law Schools from 1998 to 1999. In every
position she held, Deborah advocated for equity and inclusion, as
well as for fundamental changes to the legal profession that
would make it more ethical, fair, and humane.4
Deborah wore twin hats as a scholar, devoting equal time to
legal ethics and gender law. The most-cited legal ethics scholar
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1
Clay Risen, Deborah Rhode, Who Transformed the Field of Legal Ethics, Dies at
68, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/6EWW-PUCF.
2
For a deep dive into Deborah’s interest in ethics and leadership, see John Roemer,
The Moral Force of Deborah Rhode, STAN. MAG. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/
T3CZ-YV5W.
3
See Katharine Q. Seelye, Barbara Babcock, a Force for Women in the Law, Dies at
81, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/D6HG-4Y86.
4
As chair of the American Bar Association’s Commission on Women in the Profession, Rhode spearheaded the production of two important reports. See generally DEBORAH
L. RHODE, ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA:
WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2001); DEBORAH L. RHODE, ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN
IN THE PROFESSION, BALANCED LIVES: CHANGING THE CULTURE OF LEGAL
PRACTICE (2001).
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for many years running and the author of thirteen books on professional responsibility, her imprint on that field is undeniable.5
Among other contributions, Deborah was a powerful voice for the
argument that the legal profession’s tight controls on who can
perform legal services is a key reason why many people in our
society are denied access to justice.
Her contributions to gender law were just as deep and significant. Like many in the field of gender law, Deborah longed for a
world in which women were full, equal members of society. She
became passionate about women’s issues after watching her own
mother struggle to obtain an education and a career after time at
home raising Deborah and her sister.6 She was an eyewitness to
the harm caused by stereotypical attitudes that first pressured
women to find husbands rather than careers and then sidelined
them for their “choices.” She vowed never to be a woman who
needed an allowance from her husband—and, though married for
more than four decades, she certainly never was. Deborah’s
earliest passions revolved around the need to address poverty
and racial justice; her lifelong focus on access to justice was
deeply informed by those early commitments.7 But while a student at Yale—she was among the first women to attend after the
school became coeducational—she was also turned onto women’s
rights after a professor recommended that she read Simone de
Beauvoir’s The Second Sex in 1970.8 The spark lit by that book
remained bright for Deborah throughout her life and career.
Deborah is widely recognized as one of the most significant
contributors to the field of gender law. The field did not begin in
earnest until the 1970s, when women’s rights advocates first succeeded in getting courts and legislatures to recognize rights of sex
equality. Beginning in 1971, the Supreme Court recognized that
5
Lyle Moran, Stanford Law Prof Remembered as Leading Ethics Scholar and Advocate for Access to Justice, ABA J. (Jan. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/4LQS-ZGVM; Brian
Leiter, 10 Most-Cited Legal Ethics/Legal Profession Faculty in the U.S. for the Period
2013-2017 (1st draft), BRIAN LEITER’S L. SCH. REPS. (Oct. 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/KR65-3GAM.
6
Deborah describes this and other experiences in an oral history interview, conducted as part of the AALS Section on Women in Legal Education Oral History Project.
Association of American Law Schools, Deborah L. Rhode - Women in Legal Education Project, YOUTUBE (Jan. 9, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aYezmTxDFvk.
7
Her contributions to this field are too numerous to mention and outside the scope
of this Essay. For a brief introduction to her work in this area, see generally DEBORAH
RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); Deborah L. Rhode & Benjamin H. Barton, Access to
Justice and Routine Legal Services: New Technologies Meet Bar Regulators, 70 HASTINGS
L.J. 955 (2019).
8
Ass’n of Am. L. Schs., supra note 6.
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sex-based classifications were very likely to reflect stereotypes
and assumptions about women that had led to their inferior treatment by the government throughout history—recognition that led
to the adoption of heightened scrutiny and the invalidation of
most of the sex-based classifications that filled up state and federal code books.9 Around the same time, advocates won key legislative victories—such as the Equal Pay Act of 1963,10 Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,11 and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 197212—and key court rulings to establish a
broad scope for these new antidiscrimination laws.13 The result of
these judicial and legislative developments was a rapid transition
from a country with no positive law of sex equality to one with
significant equality guarantees over the course of less than a decade. The field of gender law was born of these developments—and
of the work of people like Deborah Rhode.
The constitutional and statutory guarantees of sex equality
were the scaffolding, but the substance of gender law would be
built out over time by advocates, lawyers, and scholars. The field
was built by those who identified areas of inquiry, developed the
theoretical approaches necessary to understand the nature of
gender discrimination, and drew theoretical and doctrinal connections across a variety of contexts. Deborah was expertly engaged
in all of these tasks. She had an incredible eye for interesting stories and controversies and the rhetorical skill to capture the at-

9
The Supreme Court began the movement toward heightened scrutiny in Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–76 (1971), and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688–91 (1973),
before settling on intermediate scrutiny for sex-based classifications in Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 197–99 (1976).
10 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 7752 Stat. 106256 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d)).
11 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17).
12 Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235, 373–
75 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88).
13 See, e.g., International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991)
(invalidating as sex discrimination an employer’s fetal-protection policy, which prohibited
nonsterile women from holding jobs involving lead exposure in a battery manufacturing
plant); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239–42 (1989) (interpreting Title VII
to prohibit employment decisions motivated by sex-role stereotyping), superseded on other
grounds by Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–
67 (1986) (establishing that sexual harassment is an actionable form of intentional sex
discrimination); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (establishing
the sex-plus theory of discrimination that can be used to challenge employment policies or
decisions based on sex plus a neutral characteristic).
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tention of others. She was fascinated by culture and relied on reflections of it to understand and teach the field. As her students
and colleagues can attest, she had a carefully curated collection
of cartoons and other images to accompany every lecture and
presentation—a sometimes-lighthearted reminder of the very
substantive point that gender law is neither developed nor applied in a vacuum. In her scholarly writing, she tackled nearly
everything: bias in the legal profession, the history of the legal
profession, glass ceiling issues, structural and unconscious bias,
sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination, women in leadership, bias in courtrooms, gender discrimination in education, and
appearance discrimination.14 And she was one of the first people
to tie these issues together as a field of study. An early monograph, Justice and Gender, became an important sourcebook for
those researching or teaching gender law. In that book, Deborah
comprehensively explored “the law’s responses to [gender] discrimination within their broader cultural context” and sought to
“reorient legal doctrine from its traditional focus on sex-based difference toward a concern with sex-based disadvantage.”15 Those
twin aims are seen throughout Deborah’s larger body of work. The
persistence of gender inequity was undeniable—and
unacceptable.
Deborah deployed this strategy in a wide variety of contexts,
making the case that gender affects every single aspect of
women’s lives—and every public, private, and social institution.
She explored the complicated interplay between law and cultural
perceptions of gender as well as the challenges of using law as a
tool for radical social change. In a fitting retort to her first dean

14 Her signature contributions to the study of gender law include DEBORAH L.
RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN EVERYDAY LIFE (2010) [hereinafter THE BEAUTY BIAS]; DEBORAH L. RHODE, WOMEN AND LEADERSHIP (2016);
DEBORAH L. RHODE, WHAT WOMEN WANT: AN AGENDA FOR THE WOMEN’S MOVEMENT
(2014); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW
(1989) [hereinafter JUSTICE AND GENDER]; DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE
DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY (1997); Deborah L. Rhode, The Subtle Side of Sexism, 16
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 613 (2007); Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988
DUKE L.J. 1207; Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617
(1990); Deborah L. Rhode, The “No-Problem” Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural
Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731 (1991) [hereinafter The “No-Problem” Problem]; Deborah L.
Rhode, Women’s Rights and Social Wrongs, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 13 (1991); Deborah
L. Rhode, Media Images, Feminist Issues, 20 SIGNS 685 (1995); Deborah L. Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 106 (1986); and Deborah L. Rhode, Missing
Questions: Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1993).
15 JUSTICE AND GENDER, supra note 14, at 1.
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at Stanford, who suggested she teach a “real” subject like negotiable instruments rather than the course in sex discrimination
she had proposed, Deborah helped build the field and cement its
place in law school scholarship and teaching. Today, it is unquestionably a “real” subject worthy of study.
In a short essay, it is impossible to do justice to Deborah’s
contributions, which were so broad and varied. Indeed, her signature talent was the ability to explore varied individual topics concretely and yet tie them together coherently. Her synthetic
strengths were on full display in two early books—Justice and
Gender and Speaking of Sex—that became foundational texts in
the field of gender law. Like her other writings, these books were
written in a manner that was accessible and inviting, a quality
that helped propel her to the top of citation-count lists. She made
the problems of gender inequity real for her readers rather than
miring them in high theory.
Her efforts to document and explain problems of inequity
were not accidental. One early insight of hers captures so much
of what she thought, what she did, and why. In a 1991 article in
the Yale Law Journal, Deborah wrote of the “‘no-problem’ problem”—a term she used to convey a disturbing level of societal comfort with sex-based disparities, which appeared to many to be
“natural, functional, and, in large measure, unalterable.”16 Too
few, she suggested, saw the disparities as a problem that merited
a legal or social response; those that did see a problem “conceive[d] it too narrowly” by ignoring either the many forms of disadvantage that existed despite neutral rules and practices or “the
intersection of gender with other patterns of subordination such
as class, race, ethnicity, and sexual orientation.”17 The narrowing
matters, she wrote, because it “reinforces attitudes that deny its
existence”; the establishment of individual equality rights “fortifies the illusion that collective problems have been resolved.”18
The failure to perceive a problem is itself, she argued, a problem.
Rather than join the hordes who accepted the progress narrative
around women’s rights, Deborah began the important work of exploring “legal norms that reflect and reinforce these ideologies of
denial as well as the feminist challenge that they present.”19

16
17
18
19

The “No-Problem” Problem, supra note 14, at 1734.
Id.
Id. at 1735.
Id.
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In later work, Deborah took seriously the obligation to first
convince her audience that there was a gender problem. Her popular book The Beauty Bias is illustrative of her approach to the
study of gender law. She begins with a stunningly exhaustive review of the empirical evidence related to appearance discrimination. She begins with evidence of “nearly universal preferences
such as clear skin, facial symmetry, and hour-glass figures.”20 She
continues with a detailed and nuanced exploration of the biases
based on body weight, attractiveness, and sex—and the very real
harms from higher costs (e.g., extra airline seats) to lost job opportunities due to false assessments of competence and intelligence.21 She also explores the intersection of appearance discrimination with gender, a study that reveals evidence of standards
that are nearly impossible for women to meet. They must conform
to sex-specific dress and grooming standards, which are often expensive and time-consuming to satisfy. They must be feminine
and attractive—but not enough to tempt men or make their wives
jealous. They must conform to beauty standards of youth, regardless of the effects of aging. Their appearance is scrutinized in a
way that men’s appearance is not—and if they do not make it appear effortless, they will be “ridiculed as vain for their efforts to
measure up.”22 But the existence of gender-based appearance discrimination is only part of the problem. It encourages women to
undertake expensive and sometimes dangerous body alterations.
It forces women into a feminine persona that may deny them
rights of individual expression. It can even be dangerous—a point
Deborah drives home with compelling facts about toxic cosmetics,
foot-damaging shoes, risky plastic surgery (including one to increase “toe cleavage”), eating disorders, steroid abuse, and even a
single year in the nineteenth century when three thousand
women were burned alive because of flammable petticoats.23 And
women who resist these pressures suffer a variety of penalties,
including lost job opportunities.
Deborah’s gift for seizing on a simple, culturally resonant example to make a sophisticated point is on full display in this book.
High heels, she explains, reflect the high degree of sex differentiation embodied in dress codes and norms, the unstated require-

20
21
22
23

THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 14, at 7.
See id. at 27–28.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 4, 36, 39.
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ment that even professional women live up to the ideals of femininity, and the harm inflicted on women by society’s unforgiving
standards.24 In marshaling examples (often with clever or shocking images to accompany them) that resonated with her audience,
Deborah understood that half the battle in gender law is shaking people of the comfort that they have developed with a sexstratified society and their unwillingness to question the norms
and practices that operate to the systematic disadvantage of
women. No doubt her history as a champion debater prepped her
for this task.
Unlike many legal scholars, Deborah applied her theories
and ideas outside traditional academic work, where they could be
used to effect real change. Perhaps most notable is the central
role she played in three different reports of the American Bar
Association—The Unfinished Agenda, Balanced Lives, and SexBased Harassment.25 Each was a significant project designed to
uncover and then eliminate the remaining barriers to gender inequity in the legal profession. As in her academic work, Deborah
gathered and presented empirical data to document the existence
of bias and disparities along every available axis. And, like in
most of her work, she communicated her findings and recommendations in language that could be easily understood and that
would resonate with her audience.
As ready as Deborah was to expose the inherent disadvantage for women in many societal norms—and solve the “‘no
problem’ problem”—she was nuanced in her theories about the
demands of equality and proposals for reform. As a general matter, she focused on practices and rules that impaired equal opportunity, judged people based on irrelevant characteristics rather
than their ability and effort, or exacerbated disadvantages based
on immutable characteristics. In this she was not so different
from many other feminist legal theorists, who drew on notions of
both formal and substantive equality to argue for social and legal
reform. But Deborah was not an absolutist and often worried that
overregulation could chill individuality and free expression. In
the context of appearance discrimination, for example, she tried
to draw the line that would best allow women to express their
authentic selves, whether that involved stilettoes and makeup or
not. She struggled with the tension between individual autonomy
24

Id. at 154–55.
See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, SEX-BASED HARASSMENT: WORKPLACE
POLICIES FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2002).
25
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and the subordination of women as a group. When Deborah
asked, “Can’t we criticize appearance-related practices without
criticizing the women who find them necessary?” she suggested
that the tension could be resolved, in line with her rejection of
absolutism.26
Throughout her four-decade career as a legal scholar,
Deborah never wavered in her commitment to women’s autonomy
and equality. She agreed with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg that
“[w]omen belong in all places where decisions are being made.”27
Toward the end of her career, she began to focus on broad themes,
such as leadership, adultery, character, and ambition. These projects allowed her to combine her interest in cultural norms and
legal theory and to write, as she enjoyed, for a broad audience.
Deborah Rhode died too young, a loss that will reverberate in
the legal academy for a long time. But we are all the better for the
contributions she made to gender law. The task remains for the
rest of us to carry forward with her insights and her desire for
change.

26

THE BEAUTY BIAS, supra note 14, at 84, 88–89.
Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg: Court Needs Another Woman, USA TODAY (May 5, 2009),
https://perma.cc/T6TB-2VQE.
27

